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THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF 
NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
By Ann Seidman 
·fNTRODUCTION: 
Two potentially contr adictory sets of interests may shape 
future economic relations between Nigeria and the United States: 
On the one hand, U.S. transnational corporations have, in the last 
two decades, discovered in Nigeria a primary source of the vital 
raw material, oil, as well as a growing market for their manufac-
tured goods. On the other hand, the peoples of both the U.S. and 
I 
1· 
' 
Nigeria, if Nigeria successfully achieves balanced, integrated 
industrial-agricultural development, could benefit from the 
resulting stimulus to expanded trade, growing employment and 
higher living standards. This paper will briefly examine the 
nature and implications of these two different, at times conflict-
ing, sets of interests, 
U.S. TRANSACTIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA 
AFTER WORLD WAR II 
Over the last quarter of a century, some of the largest U.S. 
transnational corporate concerns have played a primary role in 
shaping U.S. relations, not only with Nigeria, but with all Africa. 
They have contributed to fundamental changes in the international 
division of labor to the detriment of the peoples, not only of Africa, 
hut also the Vnited States~ itself, During World War II, U.S. firms 
2 
accummulated vast sums of capital producing weapons for the allies 
without suffering bombing raids that destroyed so much industry in 
Europe and Asia. When the war ended, they took advantage of the 
apparent American hegemony to buy up major shares of industrial 
and financial businesses in England and France, as well as Germ.any 
1 
and Japan, This gave them an indirect route to profitable acti-
vities in the crumbling empires in Africa, 2 When almost fifty -
African states attained political independence in the sixties, 
many opened the doors to more direct U.S. corporate penetration, 
By then, however, the reinvigorated financial and industrial 
conglomerates of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan -- backed 
by vigorous state intervention -- had also begun to seek entree 
in the vast African continent's mineral riches and markets. 3 But 
the corporate giants did not compete· to construct industries in the 
capital-hungry newly independent African states, Instead, they 
poured their investments into the emerging military-industrial 
complex engineered by an aggressive white minority into a regional 
subcenter dominating the southern third of the continent, By the 
end of the first independence decade, transrig.tional corporate 
investments provided about 40 percent of all manufacturing indus-
tries' capital~ over 60 percent of the banking assets, 5 and around 
90 percent of the oil refinery capacity6 in South Africa, The 
bounded rationality of the corporate managers apparently rendered 
.them particularly vulnerable to the oppressive minority rule's 
attractions: valuable mines· adroitly controlled by seven oligopo-
listic mining finance houses7 eager to obtain new capital and 
sophisticated technologies; a rich consumer market of four million 
3 
highly paid :whites~ backed oy rapidly growing military 
establishment spending by .the mid-70s, almost $2 billion a year8 
on the most advanced military machinery, equipment and weapons; 
and, above all, a large dis·ciplined pool of black labor with no 
alternative out to work for wages of a fifth to a twentieth 
of; .those .the corporations paid . .their own workers back home.? 
U, S. firms like Genera,l Motors and General Electric could and 
did -:-" take advantage bf South Africa's • ~ advantages" to manufac-
ture parts and materials, even entire models;lO for sale in the 
increasingly competitive markets of .the world including the rest 
of Africa. U.S, based transnationals invested especially heavily 
in South A,frica's burgeoning manufacturing s.ector, By the 1970s, 
they prov~ded 25 percent of directly-held foreign capital in 
' -~ •· l 'l* 
manufacturtp.g, · U.S. investments in South African factories 
total about three fourths of all U.S. investments _in manufacturing 
on the entire AFrican continent, 
Leading U.S, manufacturing companies still mainly confine their 
activities to last stage assembly and production elsewhere on the 
continent, including Nigeria, to obtain a foothold inside protected 
markets in independent African states, In South Africa, in contrast, 
they have constructed integrated factories employing African workers 
. * This significantly exceeded the1~7 percent of ~11 foreign 
capital -- almost $2 billion in investments ,~ held -- directly by U.S. 
firms in South Africa, Overall, U.S. holdings and those in manufac-
turing actually constitute a significantly larger share of foreign 
capital in South Africa, for many U.S. firms have invested unknown 
amounts indrectly there through holdings in Canada and Europe. 
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and using South African raw materials and parts, The low cost of 
labor and government subsidies and tax incentives ensure high 
rates of profit. 
Table II; 
U.S. investments in Africa (excluding South Africa) 
and in South Africa, 1977, in absolute terms ($millions) 
and as percentage of all U.S. investments abroad 
% of U.S. % of U.S. 
U.S. investments in: $ millions investments investments 
in Africa abroad 
Africa ( excluding 
South Africa) $2783 60.8 2.3 
of which manufacturing 266 5.8 0,4 
of which oil 1520 33.2 4.9 
Nigeria· 335 7.3 0.2 
of which manufacturing 41 0.8 0,06 
of which oil 250 5,4 0.8 
South Africa 1791 39.1 1.5 
of which manufacturing 710 15.5 1. 0 
Source: Department of Conunerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1978 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler became leading automotive 
producers; GM and Chrysle~ even import and assemble Japanese models 
·* · Made possible because the regime pays so little to 
finance education, health, or social welfare for the impoverished 
African majority, fqr example,it currently pays less than RSO for 
each blaI~ child's education, compared to over R650 for each white 
child ts, 
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from parent Japanese firms in which they held shares, · since South 
African consumers turned to small cars when oil prices rose. G~1 1 s 
South African subsidiary continues to sell trucks to the South African 
mili"tary despite the 1977 mandatory UN military el!l.bargo, arguing 
d f . b·1· 15 this is essential to its continue pro ita i ity. 
General Electric and ITT produce electrical equipment and 
appliances required to enable the minority regime, wherever possible, 
to automate the economy and the military machine,overcoming the 
** shortage of skilled (white) labor without upgrading blacks. U,S, 
firms like Allis Chalmers and Foxboro have sold and assisted the 
South Africa to develop sophisticated technologies for the manufacture 
17 
of nuclear weapons . 
. Three U.S. oil firms ..,.....,.. :Mobil~ Standa,rd Oil of California~ and 
Texaco 7 . the · last two WO")'."king together through Caltex ..,....,.,._ have built 
ttvo of _the largest refineries in ,A.frica in South Africa, and spread 
_their networks for .the distribution of oil -throughout southern Africa, 
.l'hey are currently assisting the · South African regime to evade the 
O~EC boycott on this strategic material, 18continuing to ship oil in 
. and store it in vast reserve supplies, They also participated 
throughout the late 60s and early 70s in devious schemes to ship oil 
to the illegal Smith ~egime in Zimbabwe in violation of UN sanctions, 
The California firm, Fluor, is the prime contractor for construction 
* This U.S. firm activity enabled the Japanese companies 
to avoid their government's prohibition on investments in South 
Africa while still selling their produce in the South African market, 
** In the mid-70s, Chrysler, ITT and GE sold a majority of 16 the shares in their South African affiliates to South African partners, 
but continued to sell them their advanced technologies and participate 
in the profits. This enabled them to avoid responsibility for local 
labor practices and the possible continuing military contribution 
of their South African connection. 
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of South Africa's $4 billion project, SASOL II, which aims to reduce 
South Africa's dependence on imported oil by half by the mid-1980s • 
. Fluor and Badger, a subsidiary of the Massachusetts firm, Raytheon --
both of which have participated in nuclear technology development --
are engaged in building the project under conditions of great secrecy, 
The biggest U.S. banks19-- especially City Bank, Chase Manhattan, 
and The Bank of America -- advised and helped finance their transac-
tional clientele's growing business interests in South Africa; and, 
even more important, , mobilized about a third of the more than 
$11 billion the international banldng community advanced in the mid 
1970s to overcome the political•economic crisis which threatened 
to engulf the regime, 
U.S. corporations'contributions to South Africa's military-
industrial build-up has won them the regime's designation as National 
Key Point Industries. This exposes the hypocrisy of the firms' 
pledge to enforce the Sullivan Principles to improve the conditions 
''c* 
of black workers in South Africa; ·for as National Key Point 
Industries, they are fully integrated into South Africa's military-
industrial operations. South African law requires them to produce 
* Ironically, the U.S. government has apparently concluded 
it is necessary to encourage negotiations with the South African 
regime to acquire the oil-from-coal technology to help alleviate 
the energy crisis here in the U.S. - though U.S. corporations are 
providing it to South Africa, 
1<* Proposed by a General Motors board member, the Sullivan . 
Principles allegedly require company sponsors to provide equal pay 
for equal work and upgrade blacks in their South African plants. 
The companies successfully 20obbied against Congresi:i:i:cmal efforts to monitor their enforcement, Ford _Motor Company _ . sacked · -· 700 
black employees because they sought to create their ~qw union and 
in effect demanded implementation of the Principles .>2.t 
* 
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strategic materials on demand,· It coerces them into operating under 
a veil of secrecy which prevents even U, S, ':"government officials 
from determining .the scope of their involvement, It even requires 
its top (white) managerial personnel to participate in para-military 
d . 22 comman o units, 
In contrast, throughout the remainder of the vast African 
continent, U,S, transnational corporate managers have turned deaf 
ears to the urgent requests of independent African states for 
capital and technologies. African governments seek to build their 
own industries and.".agriculture to foster the spread of productive 
employment opportunities and higher living standards for the masses 
of their populations. But the transnational corporations, instead, 
have devised new techniques to pursue their longtime goals: extracting 
lowcost agricultural and mineral raw materials, and searching for 
profitable ways to sell their expanding surpluses of manufactured 
goods inside protected African markets. 23 
In Nigeria, U.S. oil majors pump out millions of barrels of 
crude oil annually for shipment to the U.S. and elsewhere, Ironically, 
U. s. :. t;ransn~ti,onals ~ refinery capacity located in South Africa 
probably exceeds, not only that of Nigeri~,but their · total 
capacity on the test of the continent, U.S. manufacturing firms, 
on the other hand, still try to ship their manufactured goods to 
Nigeria in finished, or almost finished form; at mos~ almost without 
exception, they set up last stage processing plants to assemble and 
finish imported parts and materials in order to paste on the 'made 
in Nigeria' label to avoid paying tariff, And typically, 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Total ~ 1965-::1,9.7 5 
Table 3: U.S. Profits, interest and dividends shipped out of 
African countries, (excluding South Africa) by U.S. 
based transnational corporations, compared to their 
new investments from 1965 to 1975 
Direct New U.S. investments U. S. transnational 
in Africa, excluding South corporations' Amount by which 
Africa (in $ millions) profits, interests, profits, interest 
and dividends (1) and dividends 
($ millions) exceeded new dir.ect investment 
($ millions) 
$171 . -$2lf9 -$78 
83 -270 -187 
135 -28Lf -149 
374 -207 (167) 
246 -616 -370 
. 387 -610 -223 
25.5 -481 -262 
138 -410 -272 
-625 . -466 -466(2) 
-143 -799 -799(2) 
164 ~356 -192 
$2,998 
Notes: (l} This does not include managerial and licensing fees or 
compensation for government purchases of .shares of owner.ship, 
o;r overvaluation of imports .which, · in recent years ~· have 
.become increas·i ngly important forms of .shipping investable 
(2) 
Source: 
surpluses out of African countries, 
In 1973 and 1974, there was a decline in total investment, 
or a disinvestment. If this was added to the reported 
surplus value shipped out the totals would be much higher 
in those years, $1,091 million and $942 million, respectively, 
Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Census, The Statistical Abstract 
of the U.S. table entitled ' 'U.S. Direct Investment Abroad -
Direct Investment Position and Balance of Payments Income, By 
Country" (Washington D, C,: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
for years indicated), 
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U.S. firms have annually shipped home more in the form of profits, 
interest and dividends than they have invested in their businesses 
in Africa outside South Africa, 
U.S. transnational corporate investments in the South Africa -
as in other regional subcenters in Brazil and formerly, Iran - have 
contributed to changing the international division of labor, not only 
to the detriment of development throughout Africa, but also at ·the 
expense of the welfare of the people of the United States, The 
permanently high rates of unemployment that have plagued the U.S. 
since the economic 'recessiont of the mid 1970s reflects the 
transnational corporations~ success in shifting relatively labor 
intensive jobs to countries where oppressive governments coerce the 
mass of the population into low paid labor reserves, In a very real 
sense, the transnationals have pitted the welfare of the American 
people against the impoverished, almost slave like conditions created 
in regional subcenters like South Africa, Firms like General Motors, 
24 
and Ford, while laying off workers . in the United States are still 
expanding their manufacturing production in South Af rica, While 
American consumers pay ever higher prices for oil, U,S. companies 
like Mobil, Standard Oil and Texaco reap additions to their record 
profits by shipping oil to their South African refineries to fulfill 
the pressing needs of the South African military-industrial complex, 
U,S, banks advise25 American cities and states to slash welfare 
programs to qualify for loans at rising interest rates; at the same 
time, they have mobilized billions of dollars to help the South 
Africa minority regime pay the rising costs of importing oil, 
machinery and equipment, and ~ in violation of the UN embargo -
9 
the most sophisticated weapons of war, 
In short, U .·S. transnational corporations have multiplied their 
investments to help build up the military-industrial complex of the 
South African subcenter, They ignore the rnounting criticism of the 
overwhelming majority of African states and United Nations members, 
26 
among whom Nigeria - :stands out as one of the leaders. They have, 
unfortunately, convinced the U.S. government to repeatedly veto efforts 
to impose United Nations sanctions to end all trade and further 
investment in South Africa. ·Thus they .h·a·ve. widened th~ gulf, rather than 
cementing the ties of friendship, between the people of the indepen-
dent African countries and the United States, At the same time, they 
have pursued a typically neo-colonial pattern of extracting raw materials 
prying open markets for manfuactured goods, and siphoning out invest-
able surpluses, aggravating the lop sided development of under-
development . - which has perpetuated poverty throughout the rest 
of the continent. Far from benefitting the American people, this 
strategy has fostered a shifting international division of labor 
which has steadly eroded employment and living standards in mature 
indu.strial areas of the United States, itself. 
TOWARDS BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR LASTING FRIENDSHIP: 
The American people have a vital stake in building a sound economic 
foundation for lasting friendship with the peoples of Nigeria. They 
must join Nigeria and the majority of African states to convince U.S. 
authorities to support, instead of vetoing once again, United Nations 
proposals to impose effective economic sanctions to end all U.S. 
10 
;~ 
trade and future U,S, investment in South Africa, They should urge 
the U.S. government to create new incentives for U,S. firms to invest 
in and.provide technologies for the. construction of industries to 
develop balanced, integrated economies .in Nigeria and the rest of 
Africa, .This could contribute -materially to .the spread of productive 
em,ployment opportunities and higher living standards in Nigeria, At 
_the same time, it could forge .the foundation for a new pattern of 
mutually beneficial trade to help ensure full employment and pros~ 
perity in.J:he . United States. 
Extensive evidence proves .that United States industries sell 
far more goods-"':" and .hence employ- far .more workers"".,... in .the most 
!,ndust;rialized countries · of .the . world .than .they sell to the 
impoverished peoples of Africa~ Even industrialized South Africa, 
despite .the below..-poverty.,..line incomes of .the mass of its black 
population, buys more goods per capita than does .the rest of the 
continent, .This is not to say, incidentally-, that U,S. trade with 
South Africa is vital in anyway to .the United States; as Table 
_shoW's, .neither exports .to nor imports from So~th Africa, though 
vital to .thejninority regime .there,are more than marginal to its 
major trading partners, 
* .The . United States government can hardly object to sanctions, 
since it has, itself, requested the . UN to impose them on Iran to free 
some 50 American hostages~ how much more reason for sanctions to 
free m.027 . than 20 million black Africans from Bondage in South 
A:f;rica, . 
Country/trading 
partner 
Developed market 
economies(l)/ 
Developed market 
economies 
South Africa 
Rest of Africa 
United Kingdom/ 
Developed market 
economies 
South Africa 
Rest of Africa 
United States/ 
Developed market 
economies 
South Africa 
Rest of Africa 
Federal Republic of 
Germany/Developed 
market economies 
South Africa 
Rest of Africa 
Japan/ 
Developed market 
economies 
South Africa 
Rest of Africa 
France/ 
Developed market 
Table 4: Trade of leading developed market economies with each other, with South Africa, and 
with other African states, as a percentage of all their trade, and in terms of per 
capita trade with their trading partners (1977) 
Imports from 
$000 
517, 7lfl,OOO 
5,383,000 
38,010,000 
47,269,805 
1,669,057 
2,676,440 
79' 771, 731 
1,337,958 
15' 628' 15lf 
75,068,211 
817,221 
6,582,743 
27,416,045 
934,794 
1,192,862 
% of total 
imports 
69.2 
0.7 
5,0 
74.3 
2,6 
4.2 
54,0 
0.9 
10.6 
74,5 
0,8 
6.5 
38.9 
1. 3 
1. 7 
Per capita(2) 
imports from 
trading Eartner 
($) 
663 
217 
95 
61 
66 
7 
102 
53 
39 
96 
32 
16 
35 
37 
3 
ExEorts to 
$000 
517,741,000 
5,643,000 
42,262,000 
41,069,682 
1,024,709 
4,239,591 
74,948,581 
1,078,949 
4,378,911 
89,636,247 
1,126,441 
5,661,783 
38,212,206 
761,606 
5,717,957 
% of total 
exports 
69,2 
0,7 
5.8 
71,5 
1.8 
7,4 
62,8 
0,9 
3,6 
76.0 
1.0 
4,8 
46,4 
0,9 
7,1 
Per capita(2) 
exports from 
trading partner 
($) 
663 
225 
105 
53 
·41 
11 
96 
43 
11 
115 
45 
14 
49 
30 
14 
economies 49,070,498 69.8 63 44,969,929 71.0 58 
South Africa 482, 410 0. 7 19 496, 946 0, 8 20 
Rest of Africa 5,585,985 7.9 14 8,620,850 13,6 21 
Notes: (1) Includes United States, Canada, South Africa, United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Malta, Spain, 
Yogoslavia, Israel, Japan; (2) dollar value of trade with trading partner divided by trading partner's 
population; (3) rounded off to nearest dollar; 
Source: Calculated from United Nations ¥earbook of International Trade Statisticst 1977, Vol, 1 (New York; 1978); 
llN Statistical Yearbook. 1978 
Table 5t Nigerian trade with U. S., given Nigeria's 1976 
present level of industrialization, compared to 
potentials if Nigeria reached South Africa's 1976 
level of industriali zation (1) 
Estimated(2) 
Imports per 
Imports from U.S. $1000 Nigerian Imports as % of 
inhabitant 1976 U.S. exports 
Actual 1976 levels 894,026 $11. 92 0, 77 
Potential at South Africa's 
level of industriali-
zation (1) 3,975,000 $53.00 3.46 
Exports to U.S. $1000 Exports as % of 
1976 U.S. imports 
Actual 1976 levels 3,492,047 2.86 
Potential assuming 
South Africa's level 
of industrialization(3) 4,015,854 3.29 
Balance of payments $1000 Difference in % of 
with U.S. u.s. imports and 
exports 
Actual - 1976 2,598,021 2.09 
Potential at South 
Africa 1.s level of 
industrialization 40,854 0.17 
' 
Notes: (1) This assumes all other factors, including population, remained at 1976 
levels, If Nigeria attained a more balanced income distribution than 
that of South Africa, it would probably constitute a larger market, 
(2) Given the lack of accurate population estimates for either Nigeria or 
South Africa's black population, these calculations assume a conservative 
75 million Nigerians,and 25 million South Africans. 
(3) This simply assumes Nigeria's exports would expand to levels commensurate 
with South Africa's! undoubtedly, too ,' its composition would change, 
Source: Calculated from U.N. International Trade Statistics, 1978, Vol, I, pp. 711, 964 
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Nigeria, with a population at least .three times .that of South 
Africa, currently buys about two thirds the amount of goods from the 
·2s 
U.S. as does South Africa, The United States suffers a serious 
balance of payments deficit in its trade with Nigeria, because it 
imports vast quantities of Nigerian oil, but sells so little there. 
If Nigeria had today achieved levels of industriali zation comparable 
to that of South Africa, however, it could ouy more than three times 
the amount of goods from the U,S, that the latter currently sells to 
South Africa, This would, as Taole 5 indicates, almost wipe out 
the U.S. balance of payments deficit with Nigeria, At the same time, 
it would stimulate the employment of . aoout . fifty thousand addi-· 
tional U,S. workers:9 If Nigeria attained a more balanced industrial 
and agricultural pattern of development and more equitably distributed 
the resulting incomes among .the masses of its inhabitants than does 
South Africa, furthermore, it could purchase even more U,S, exports, 30 
The American public should understand, however, that neither 
Nigeria or any other country in Africa can, as urged by western 
orthodoxy, leave the processes of development to vaguely defined 
'market forces,' Examination of the inherited externally dependent 
structures of the typical African economy shows that transnational 
corporations still dominate .the 'connnanding heights' of their so-called 
modern export sectors: they still handle the management, the techno~ 
logies and marketing of basic industries producing for export; they 
still control the trade channels importing high priced manufactured 
goods for the narrow high income groups who can afford to purchase 
them; and they still manage the_ banks and financial institutions 
- 12 ~ 
which facilitate the continuing drain of investable surpluses, Two 
decades of independent African experience 31 reveals that African 
entrepreneurs have neither the capital nor the skill to compete with 
the transnationals. More frequently, they join together with them 
to gain a marginal share of the profits in the business - perpetuating 
their nation's lop-sided growth which condemns the mass of their 
fellow citizens to lifelong poverty, Only the state can muster 
the capital, the knowhow, and the national will to exert adequate 
control over the connnanding heights of the typical African country 
and implement plans to attain a more desirable balanced, integrated 
32 pattern of development. The state must formulate a longterm 
industrial strategy directed, over a 20 year periodJto the fundamental 
reconstruction of the national economy, Western capital, management 
and technologies cannot shape the outcome of this strategy; transnational 
corporations' short-term profit-maximizing inevitably tends to foster 
decisions perpetuating growth without development, The central state 
must identify, for construction in each phase of its long term pers-
pective, specific industrial and agricultural projects embodying 
appropriate technologies and providing productive employment opportuni-
ties to every sector, It must formulate and implement an incomes policy 
directing investable surpluses to. financing each project to ensure that . 
it is built according to plan, The state may then negotiate with parti-
cular transnational companies to contribute to the construction and 
operation of these projects in the framework of long-term nationally-
determined goals. 
A note of caution: The experience of almost 50 African states 
suggests the necessity of focusing attention on the creation of two 
f . . . 33 sets o new institutions. Firsc, the state, itself, must design new 
institutions to ensure that it does exert adequate control over the 
commanding heights and key sectors of the political economy to carry 
out its longterm strategy, Second, the state and political leadership 
must institutionalize representation of the working people -- the 
wage earners and peasantry -- at every level of the state decision-
making apparatus which formulatef and implements plans, Extended state 
intervention in the economy requires a rapid expansion of the numbers 
of civil servants and managers, creating a danger of the emergence of 
what has come to be termed a "bureaucratic _b,ourgeoisie, 1134 Unchecked, 
this new class of state entrepreneurs may exercise its expanded state 
* power to advance its own -- not the national--interests. Only insti-
tutionalization of the participation of working people in formulating 
and implementing plans can, in the last analysis, ensure that those 
plans do lead to the desired spread of productive employment oppotuni-
ties and rising living standards for the mass of the population, 
This is not the place to discuss the kinds of state institutions 
required to shape effective state intervention in Nigeria, and to 
ensure adequate participation of the working people in that process, 
Those issues will be explored in more depth in the sessions relating to 
law, But, clearly, Americans sincerely desiring to build sound founda-
tions of friendship with Nigeria should welcome -- r egardless of 
* It is widely recognized that in South Africa where the 
regime has, from the outset, played a typical state capitalist role 
in stimulating industrial and agricultural expansion, the minority 
controlling the state machinery has explicitly exercised it to advantage 
its members at the expense of the mass of the people; the key difference 
is .that in South Africa~ .these state entrepreneurs have used law to 
exclude .the mass of the ' African population on racist grounds. 
- 14 -
inevitable disparagement by those inbuea with conventional western 
~-
wisdom -- the involvement of an appropriately part i cipatory state 
to shape and implement nationally-oriented plans to provide increas~ 
ingly productive employment opportunities and rising standards of 
living for the entire Nigerian population, 
- 15 -
Summary and Conclusion 
This brief paper permits only a ske t ch of the basic argument, 
Nevertheless, abundant evidence reveals the past role of U.S. trans-
national corporations in purusing a path contrary to that necessary 
for building a sound foundation for Nigerian-American friendship. 
They have done so at the expense of both the peoples of Africa and 
the United States, To cement the bonds between the peoples of these 
two nations, Americans must urge the United States government to 
begin to chart a new course. On the one hand, they should insist 
that the U.S. join the majority of African states and United Nations 
to impose effective economic as well as military sanctions to hasten 
the end of apartheid in South Africa, On the other, they should 
press the United States to create new incentives to encourage U.S. 
firms to contribute thei r capital and technology to Nigeria and other 
independent African states to help them build up their industry and 
agriculture as the basis for sound, mutually beneficial trade relations 
redounding to the benefit of the peoples of Africa as well as the 
United States. 
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I have respond ~ d to questions 1 thraugh-4 in the brief paper 
I have -sent in tc Chairman Solarz in advance of thi s ~riee-cing. I 
would like to focus my atten t ion here on the remaining questions: 
5. I would like t o emphasize that United States firms 1 trade 
with and invest·:nent in South Africa have played and continue t -; 
play a crucial role in strengthening the military- industrial 
capacity of that co~ntry 1 2 oppressive, racist regi~e. U.S. fir~s ' 
dir~ct investment in South Africa , a c:Juntry with little more 
than five percent of the total population of the A~rican conti-
nent, ~quals . 6ver a -half of their direct investment in the rest 
of Africa. It makes up about four-fifths of all investment in 
manufacturing industries on the e~tire contine nt. 
U.S. firms' investment in manufacturing is particularly i m-
port ant in the s tr_a tegic indus tri e.:t sec t ·ors , reauired to en ab le 
the white minority retain its c ~ntrol over the black majer±ty. 
These include transport where General Motors, · Ford and Chrysler 
have long built cars and trucks which facilitate the necessary 
mobility for the whi t e population, and ·in particular the armed 
forces. GM has admitted that its local subsiiiaries continu e to 
sell trucks t : the milihary. li .S. firms like Gen eral Electric 
and ITT continue to contribute the necessary sophisticated tech-
nologies essential to electrify ~nd increasirigly auto mate the 
military-indastrial co~~lex, reducing the ~eed to upgrade blacks 
as the scarcity of skilled white w rkers has made itself felt. 
U .s. firms provided· the· te.::hnolo~ie,;; that enabled South Africa 
to enrich its own uranium, creating what many authorities con-
sider to be the capacity to produce nuclear weapons . 
• I ' l 
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Several U.S. oil firms, including Standard Oil of Califo ~nia, 
Texaco, ~nd Mobil, provide a major share of the oil refining 
capacity and ship in r.mch of the crude oil essential t r: enable South 
machinery 
<Africa _ t _o~ keep i .ts :. mil.i -ta-ry•industria1 I movir:g, as well as 
to ship added amounts to the illegal regime of Rhodesia. (It 
~s interesting that, although SouthAfrica has no khown oil 
deposits, U.S. firms h ~ ve built there more oil refinery capacity 
than in all the rest of Africa, combined.) 
As the re6~~~ioft of the 1970s spread into South Africa, re-
ducing output in m~ny sectors of manufacturing, U.S. banks played 
a major role in mobilizing international funds borrowed by the 
South African regime to continue to import the necessary machinery 
and eqtiipment for its military-indu~ trial growth; oil; and military 
weapons in violation of the UN embargo. Although some of the 
banks, like Citibank and Chase Manhattan, have said they would 
no longer lend directly t J the South Afr :.ca:-i govern1nent, they do 
~ill make loans to facilitate the continued sale of goods needed 
to further strengthen strategic . sectors. To my knowledge, the Bank 
of America has not even agreed to stop lending funds to the government. 
But the reality is that any funds loaned to South Africa, whether to 
the public, parastatal (ie state corporation~, or private sectors, 
help the regime to finance its continued rule. Significantly, al-
though the high price of gold has reduced the importance of borrowing, 
its outstanding debt is estimated to exceed $11 billion (of which 
U.S. banks are said to have mobilised about a t h ird); and it con-
ftnues to borrow to retain its relationships with the international 
money markets in case of furth 2r need. 
It is a myth that U.S. fi rm s ~an, thr ~u~h the illusory Sullivan 
Principles, c intribut~ to bettering the c -:nditions of black workers 
in South Africa. Fir s t, it is ironic t h at 'what might be termed the 
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1South Afr i ca l obby' d::SSuaded Congress from monitor i ng the e n fo rce-
ment of those principles in South Africa. Those o f us who have 
watched the dif f iculties o f ensuring a f firmative action here in 
the United States know how much more difficult it is where the 
governnent, white unions, and custom combine to thwart its voluntary 
enforcement. But more important, U.S. firms do not e mploy many 
black Africans. Altogethe r , they e ~ploy ab out 100,000 workers, less 
than one percent of the total. About half of these are whites, 
skilled workers, to handle their technologically sophisticated 
machinery which the minority regime has eagerly encouraged them 
to introduce t6 reduce dependence on black labor. In fact, U.S. 
firms' introduction of new technologies has actually reduced 
black ~mployment in some sectors. For example, Texaco issued 
data purportedly showing that it had upgraded blacks in the 15 
years f~om 1962 to 1977; but careful examination showed that, al-
though it had increased production and sales, it had reduced the 
_ total labor force, and reduced blacks as a percentage of the total 
from about 60 to about 40 percerit. With black une~ployment today 
at about two million -- about one out of four black · worke rs 
the role of the sophisticated technologies introduced by U.S. firms 
is particularly counter-pr oductive. 
It is especially ironic that Genera l Motors has played a leading 
role in sponsoring the Sullivan Principl e s, for it is simultaneously 
contributing significantly to South Africa's military capacity de-
signed to coerce the Africans into the status of a cheap lqbor re-
serve. Gene ral Motons, i t se 1f, h 2s b ~ en desi gn a ted by t~e South 
African r e gime as a Nati onal li e~ point I~dustry; it s white pefs6~ne l, i r 
time of e mergency,is expected t o partici pate in paramilitary 
Co m..."Tlando Units ir: order t c reli e ve profe ssional soldier·s of the 
task of defe nc.1.ing the pl arit. TL.:.s s~.lt;ge s ts tha t , far more i rripo :::' ~~ >. ::-it 
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than any possible contributior. it ~~ght be ~aking t ~ improving 
wor~cers' cor.ditions, as far as the :ninority regime is C'.)ncenned, 
is its strategic rel~. 
In short, the policy implications of U.S. econcmic relations 
with South fl..frica, it seems to :ne, . rest in their continued con-
tribution to bolstering up a racist, minoiity regime. This serves 
to make the peoples of the rest of Africa eu~picious of our motives 
in any other parts of inaependent Africa. It undoubtedly renders 
possibilities of jeveloping trade and investments in the rest of 
that vast continent far more difficult. We might recall that 
Nigeria nati~nalized British Petroleum's assets because it re-
sented that c~untry•s involvement in providing oil to South Africa. 
It is not at all i~possible that Nigeria or other independent 
states might take similar retaliatory actions against the U.S. 
This . leads me to _ the next question. (#6 seems to be missi~g) 
7. Africa is a vast storehouse of mineral wealth which, to 
date, has been. only partially surveyed. One of the reaons why 
South Africa is a primary sourca of mineral~ (aside from oil) 
for the U.S. is because it has been far reore thoroughly surveyed 
than have other regions of the conti~ent; and U.S. firms, together 
with their British predecessors, have focused their attention on 
<leve.loping·udnes there. But there is . enormous potential in other 
parts of the continent which ~ave only partially beer ~evealed 
since almost 50 countries have attained independence. For example, 
just ainong tne so-called 1 frontli'l.e states 1 , in the last two decads .:0 
extensive mi~e~al resources have been di3covered and are beginn~ng 
to be develo~ed: Tanzania is kn~wn to ~~ave iron ore, phosphates und 
ur~r..ium; I U!J.derstand that the Fcjeral :Depublic of Germany is negot~­
ating to develop their newly discovered uranium deposits. Moza~­
bique has iron ore, coal, and there gre, I am told 1 p~ssibilitie ~ 
that t~ey may have oil a~d/or n a t u ral gas. Bo t s wana has be e n 
dis-0overed to have some of the riche~t diamond mines and copper-
nickel deposits, as well as coal. Zambia, in additi on to its 
well-known copper mines ( i t is one of the major copper exporters 
in the world), has lead, coal, and, I tinderstand, recently dis-
covered uraniur.i a-s well. Angola has a wide variety of mineral 
resources, including iror., diamonds, copper, and, most important, 
6il, currently being pumped ou~ primarily by the U.S. firm, Gulf. 
There are, of course, untold agricultural resources in these 
relatively underpopulated regions: coffee, C8tton , groundnuts, 
tea, tobacco, sugar -- al l these and more are or coulrl be pro-
duced. 
T ~ill nbt~ta~~ the : time, he~~. to list all t~e mineral and 
agricultural resources aviilable on the vast contine~t of Africa, 
an area about three times the size of the United States. I would 
guess that on-going geolcgical surveys will reveal that it con-
tains almost all, · if not. all, the essential minerals necessary 
for the industrialized nations of the world. 
As yet, American dependence on African minerals is not great, 
except in the case of oil. Much has ' bean made of the importance 
of chrome from South Afri c a and Rhodesia; but in fact my under~ 
standing is t'bat chrome i s available from Turkey, as well as 
-- even the U.S., although at somewhat higher cost. 
elsewherel Furthermore, the U.S. has extansive stockpiles, and it 
is very possible that new technologies are be,ing introduced now 
that within a few years will make chrome alraost unnecessary. 
On the other harid, oil, which remains of great importance tn 
the United States, is being produced in increasing quantities in 
several parts of Africa. Algeria, Libya and Nigeria are ~ajor 
suppliers of oil to the United States, with Nigeria by far the 
most important of these t hree. In addition, Angola's oil wellSj 
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bperated by Gulf , are capable of producing vast quantiti~s 
and could become another major source of oil for the U.S. 
The U.~. ·also purchases significan~- a~ounts of coffee from 
a number of African -states, and cocoa mainly from Ghana and 
Nigeria. 
At present, U.S. dependen~e on African resources fias ' been in-
creasing rapidly primarily with respect to oil. 
8. Africa has not been as important economically to the U.~. 
as has, for example, Latin America: in the past, pri~arily because 
British, French and, to a lesser extent Po~tuguese and Belgian 
colonialism pre7 ented U.S. firms from engaging in investment and 
trade. Since African countries have attained independence, as 
the data shows, Africa has become rapidly more important both 
ih terms of trade and in terms of inve$tment. 
But the potential is far greater, especially if the independent 
African states are encouraged to industrialize as they would like 
to. For the U.S. clearly sells far more goods, per ca~ita, to 
industrialized states than to primarily agricultural countries. 
And today, when the balance of payments constitutes a major problem 
for the U.S., a primary ' need is to find new markets for manufact-
ured goods. Indtlstriali zed countries, with rising productivity 
and incomes, can · ahd will -buy more and more of the manufactured 
goods the U.S. can produce embodying new technologies: machinery 
and equipment for new fac t ories and to increase productivity in 
agriculture and on the mines, smelters and refineries. 
9. Africa's comme~cial and economic potential has been curbed 
in the past by colon ial policies which have res tr icted most countries 
there to producing low-value raw materials and buying primarily 
luxury and semi-luxury items for the narrow high income groups asso c i-
ated with raw materials production . I f , on the other hand, the Afri-
can states can be encouraged t o develop tl1eir intust~ies to increase 
productivity in all sectors of their economi~s, they could, over 
the next half century, emerge as an important indu strial region 
and hence as a growing area fo~ U .S~ '· investinent ~ ~ aiid trade. 
10. In my opinion, the U.~. should encourage greater ec ono~ic 
trade and investment with Africa in order to help them realize 
this potential. This necessitates encouraging them to develop 
as trading parters to maximize mutually . beneficial trade and 
growth. 
-11. In my experience of eight :_years -of ·· teaching and doing 
research in African university in West, East and Central Africa, 
I have been convinced that the African states are eager to expand 
trad~ and eager for U.S. investme~ts. The biggest obstacles to 
that expansion are lack of understanding and willingness to assist 
African states realize their desired objectives -- which , ir..· ·the 
long run; as I suggested above, would contribute to more mutually 
beneficial trade and relations with the U.S. as well as other 
countries. U.S. firms have primarily invested in extracting 
minerals :· and purchasing crude ·· agricul t ural produce · at · low prices , 
from independent Afric~n stateE, . in: a pbt~ern ' too reminiscent 
of the solonial pa~t. African states are convin6ed that only 
by industrializing can they raise the living standards of the 
vast majority o f their populations. Therefore they are dismayed 
when t h ey see U.S; firms pouring investme nts into industries in 
South Africa, someti :ne s to process crud e materials produced in 
independent neighboring states, sometimes producing machinery, 
parts and equipment which they 3eek to sell in independent African 
countries. 
U.S. firms have apparently been reluctant to invest in manu-
facturing indust ries to process loc nl ly-p~oduced raw mat eri a ls 
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in ind~pendent African countries. They have not b~ilt inte-
grated industrial projects capable of contributing to balanced, 
integrated African econor.ies; for the most part, what little 
investing they have done in the mar.uf acturing sector has been 
in last stage assembly and processing of imported materials and 
parts 1 primarily to gain access to the narrow high income markets. 
But, as African goverr ...Inent s have sought to , emphasize, the 
lack of integrated industrial growth has left their eco~omies 
dependent on the sale of their mineral and agricultural materials 
on an uncertain world market. And when prices of those exports 
fall, they cannot buy much from in-::lustrialized nations like the 
United States. As long as they remain dependent on the export 
of crude materials·, they are unlikely to be able to expand . as 
·valuabl e trading partners. 
U.S. businessmen have -expressed a reluctance to invest in African 
countries where the state is playing a major role in the ec onomy. 
This reluctance seems to stem from a fundamental . miscomprehension 
of the economic reilities of Africa. There is no agency in the 
typical African country, other than the state, which cari undehtake 
the process of restructuring the economy and investing in the basic 
industries Deeded to ·spread productivity and raise living standards. 
Colonialism deprived would-be entrepreneurs of the skills;afid capit~1 · 
necessary to b~ild indus t ries at a time whe n the relatively small 
size of viable units would have· made their entry tnto manufacturing 
possible. Today, the vast size at which economies of scale come inta 
play renders the capital costs prohititive for individuals. Only t~e 
~tate can possfol:; play tt:e ~ssero.ti2.l role tf p lanning and - developi n,6 
industrial growt~. 
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This is as true in South Africa as ir. the rest cf Afri~a. 
It is simply a myth to say, as §outh Africa~ apologists fre-
quently do, thRt South Africa's economy i s characterized by 
free e~terprise. On the c ontrary, it is a highly integrated 
military-industrial complex dbminated by seven po~erful o:i-
gopolistic mining finance houses closely tied in ~ Ji th · the 
state through parastatals which have developed basic industries. 
What , i::> ~ particularly reprehensible in t he South African case 
is the state's open avowal of racist policies desi gned to 
keep the · African m?jority in a state of semi-slavery; and the 
fact that its industria:ization program is designed to create 
a founda t :..on for the Flilitary migI?-t necessary for the white 
minooity to continue its rule. 
The independent African st~tes,se eking to industrialize 
to pr~duce the goods and services required to mset the needs 
Of the ~ vast majority .of their Citizens, .like".rTise must invest 
in and regulate the development of their economies. For U.S. 
firms to abstain from investing in those circumsta~ces in the 
independent countries at th~ · same time that they pour funds ind 
advanced technologies into b·uilding up South A:L' rica' s mili t:ary-
indu : trial capacity appears to the former to be rank hypocrisy. 
The U.~. government could help to ericourage U.S. firms to 
invest in industrialization programs in independent African 
states, while discouraging those invest ments in South Africa, 
in a number of ways. To ment.ion only a few: It could set 
up its consular adv isory agencies, not in South Africa as at 
presBE.t, but in a nei r;hbo ring ~-::-·mtry like, for example, Zambia. 
It could eliminate tax credits for firms inv esting in South 
African manufacturing and o t h e r 3ectors, and consider additional 
-.1...,,-
tax advantages for firms investing in i~de~endaat African states, 
especially in manufacturing industries. It could end all Export-
Import Bank insurance and/or , guarantees t~ firms shipping goods 
to South Africa, while ~e~kirig new opportunities to p~ovide 
credit, insurance aLd guarante~s especially for the sale of 
machinery and equipment to help independent African states in-
dustrtalize. · It could support proposals made in the di3cussions 
about a New Economic Order to ac~ieve international price stability 
.for such ez.ports as cocoa and copp<;r to enable countries lLce 
Ghana and Zambia (along ·with all other independent Africa countries) 
:to achieve a stable income which would permit them _to plan continued 
~import of ~achinery and equipment to build their industrial sectors. 
Note: support UN embargo on trade, investment in South Africa, One could go on, 
I believe it would be worth this coillI!littee' s time to exp lo.re s~rre of this 
possi~iliti 0~ in nenth. 
12. The policy implications of our depeEdence on African e~ergy 
sources, and particularly oil, in te~m~·of ~c6no~ics, alone, are of 
two kinds. (Ther~ are obviously all kinds of political implications, 
a~ well.) First, it would obviously be unwise to continue, as at 
present, to thumb our noses at the independent African states by 
continuing to continue to expand trade and investment with the racist 
regime of South Africa; this is particularly tru·e in the case of the 
U.S. oil firms which ar'e playing such an important ro.le in helping 
to keep open the oil supply lines to South Africa. We have seen 
that Nigeria has nationalized British Petroleum'~ assets because 
of its continued trade with and refinery activities in South Africa. 
It is, to put it rather mildly, unwise to court similar actions vis 
a vis u.~. firms' investments in ail production elsewh~re on the 
continent. If Nigeria, Algeria and Libya, . alone, were to decide 
not to sell oil to the U.S., it would have serious implications which 
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I do not ne~d to elaborate here. 
In this connection, it seems particularly unwise to c ~ ntinue 
to withhold recognition from rtngola which -is another potentially 
important source of oil for the u.~. It seems unrealistic to 
insist that Angola must first send away the Cuban technicians 
and military personnel (I am told the latter are becoming rela-
- tively less important, while the ~,~tol'f are vital to restor:i,ng 
the economy to a reasonably norc al base of operations); with 
South Africa rapidly and with u.u. and other Western :firms~ ) 
assistan~e)ouilding~up its military-industrial capac~ty, Angola 
must undoubtedly feel the necessity for security. After all, 
South Africah troops invaded Arigola and ' u~~d its vastly superior 
weaponry to con~uer a majcr part of Angolan territory. Furthermore, 
the tiny opposition party, UNITA, makes no secret of its reliance 
on South African military assistance. If, on the other hand, ~he 
U.S. were to end ·· :the "flow of"essential machinery and equipment as 
~ell as oil to South Africa, these fears would undoubtedly be some-
what assuaged. If, in addition, the U.S. woul d recognize Angola 
:;a;.;.~which, I understand, Gulf Oil Company h as for s ome years urged 
it might well be possible that Angola would feel sufficiently secure 
to reduce its dependence on outside military ass "'... stance-. --· . _, ,, : ~ 
The second set:of policy implications relate to the U.~. balance 
of payments problems. It is clear that oil imports have played a 
big role in them, and a glance at the statistics I have given you 
suggest why. The underdeveloped African countries which are shipping 
oil to the U.S. cannot a§~yet buy ·many of the so~histicated machines 
and equipment which the U.~. could sell them. If thes~.countries 
were to industrialize, however, they would, as suggested above, . be 
able to do so. This simply reinfvrces my argument that the U.S. 
government should take whatever steps possible to encourage 
these states to industrialize, 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
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Some Statistics on U.S. trade and investments in Africa 
1. u.s. trade with Africa has been . growing very rapidly since 
nearly 50 African countries have attained independence in 
the last two decades. Total African exports to the United 
States in 1977 were $17,024,million, some 31 times greater 
than in 1960. Total African imports were $5, 546,million, 
almost 7 times greater than in 1960. Of the rapidly growing 
exports to the U.S., about three fourths (76%) consisted of 
oil, mainly from Nigeria, Lib~a and Algeria (about half was 
oil from Nigeria) • 
African exports to the U.S. make up 11.6% of all U.S. imports, 
and A:=rico.n.i...Ltports from the U.S. make up about 4.6% of all u.s. 
exports. That is, the U.S. buys much more from Africa than 
it sells to them, although they have been buying a rapidly in-
creasing amount. 
2. U.S. investment in Africa has been growing since independence, 
as well. In Africa outside of South Africa, the U.S. investments 
totalled $2783 million in 1977, of which only $266 million (9%) 
was in manufacturing, and $1.,520 million (54%) was in oil. 
This makes up about 2.3% of total U.S. investments overseas, although 
U.S. investment in African manufacturing constitutes only 0.4% of 
_ all U.S. overseas manufacturing investment. U.S. investment in 
oil in independent African states constitutes only 4.9"/o of all 
overseas U.S. investment in oil. 
3. The issue of U.S. jobs in relation to U.S. trade with Africa is 
difficult to judge. Since exports to independent African states 
have not grown as rapidly as imports from them, a~d total only 
about 4·.6 %, mostly manufactured goods, one probably could guesti-
mate that exports to Africa provide about 5% of all jobs associ-
ated with exports. On the other hand, since African independent 
countries provide about 7-So/o of all U.S. imports simply as oil, 
a reducticm of that trade could have a serious impact on the whole 
U.S. economy and, of course, jobs. 
It might be added that if African states were to industrialize, 
they would probably constitute a better market for U.S. manufacturdd 
goods; industrialized states consume a higher percentage of U.S. 
exports than do less industrialized states. 
4; · The above statistics refer to Africa outside of South Africa. 
South African trade with the U.S. has also grown rapidly, but 
not as rapidly as independent Africa, and far less rapidly than 
Nigeria's trade. South Africa sc l d the U.S. $1,269 million worth 
of goods in 1977, about 7.4% of all U.S. imports from the rest o f 
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